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POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT: DYNAMICS, DISTRIBUTION AND 
DIVERSITY 
 
When researchers attempt to study population and development, and particularly the 
role of migrations, the focus is normally on national level trends, frequently involving 
time-series analyses of more generic indicators of population change and economic 
growth. The migration field does, of course, deal with questions of the integration of 
migrants, at a macro-level evaluating their impact on social diversity and cohesion by 
turning to ecological-level indices covering clustering. 
 
This paper takes a different approach in part inspired by the model developed by Le 
Heron, Britton and Parson (1992; see also Le Heron and Parson 1996) to analyse a 
related question: restructuring. This they saw as likely to be induced and thus 
frequently exogenous to a particular socio-demographic system.  For example, 
policies effecting restructuring at a regional level will often come from some central 
agency external to the region, or even outside the geographic territory or country.  
There are also other changes that can be spontaneous in nature, arising from a mix of 
factors and situations endogenous to a given area.1 In both cases, so these authors 
argue (1992:5), we must deal with “processes operating at various geographic 
scales...”. 
 
To this end this paper thus employs as demographic variables indices plotting sub-
national changes, thereby recognising that population dynamics at the national-level 
are likely to be a composite of complex societal forces varying from region to region.  
For much of this essay, which is more an exercise in setting research agendas than a 
full-scale empirical analysis, the regional breakdown is very broad, attempting to 
distinguish between the more dominant and less dominant poles at any time. 
 
This paper also does not use conventional indicators of economic growth, in part 
because they are too gross for our purposes. The use of such economic aggregates 
(and equally blunt demographic measures, such as simple growth) has essentially 
limited our capacity to provide “empirical evidence on the old question of how 
demographic change affects economic development” (Lindh and Malmberg 1999:432-
33), and vice-versa.  In this present study I turn instead to the notion of capital, in the 
broad sense of the term as used in economics.  In this I emphasise physical (in 
particular land-based resources) and human capital rather than financial, although 
clearly financial capital flows are also important for the story I am outlining here. 
 
I then look at the ways in which historically transfers of different forms of capital 
have produced shifts between regions in terms of the foci for economic development, 
                                                 
1  I would prefer to use the term eco-system in a very broad sense as used by human ecology to 
include all factors, population, society, technology and environment (the old POET paradigm of 
the 1960s), but this phrase has become too closely associated with the natural sciences, and thus is 
too limiting for my purposes. 
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and in turn appear to be correlated to some significant demographic changes, 
including both domestic and international migration flows.  It will be noted that I use 
the term correlated rather than causally-linked.  I do so consciously because, as I have 
noted, this paper is more an exploration of issues than a definitive analysis. 
 
I divide New Zealand’s post-Waitangi history into four general periods: 
 
1. The era of the Transfer of political capital, or the transfer from tino rangitiratanga 
to kawanatanga, 1840-70. Here we go beyond classical economics terminology to 
recognise that for transfers of other forms of capital to have an impact there had 
first to be a setting of the rules of engagement for kawanatanga.  Demography and 
its half-sibling economics may seem to be technical in orientation yet, in reality, 
they both deal with the political economy: demography has been ‘political 
arithmetick’ since its 17th century inception. 
2. The era of the Transfer of physical capital, 1870-1926 
3. The era of Relative equilibrium, 1926-1970 
4. The era of Transfer of human capital, 1970-1996 
 
THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL CAPITAL, 1840-702 
 
This period saw the virtual transfer of political-economic authority and capital from 
Maori to Pakeha, or to use Belich’s phrases a transfer from “false” to “loose” to 
“tight” empire.  This was achieved between the 1840s, when on the ground the reality 
was that empire was merely a “façade”, and the 1870s when the empire was 
“tightening” (Belich 1996:231, 249). To the extent that any “policy” is construed as a 
compromise between demands coming, on the one hand, from pressure groups, the 
settlers in this case, and, on the other hand, with what is viewed as critical by 
government, the distant Colonial Office, officials in New Zealand, and colonial or 
provincial legislatures (the latter enduring from 1853 to 1876), then “policy” can be 
seen as having been the driver of this transfer. 
 
The single most important instrument for the transfer of political capital was the 
Treaty of Waitangi, a not unimportant aspect of which was, of course, the intended or 
unintended disjunctions3 in translation between the Maori and English versions.  
Regardless of the intentions of the signatories, and leaving aside its reprise in recent 
decades as our founding constitutional document, its role initially, as I have 
                                                 
2  For a provocative overview of the economy in general from 1840 to the present, see Easton 
(1997:Chapt.2). For Maori I draw mainly on Pool (1991), and on a paper of Bedford and Pool 
(under editorial review) that deals in detail with the interactions between Maori mobility and 
development. 
3  Belich argues that “it was a deliberate or semi-deliberate act of deceit by those who translated the 
treaty into Maori,... (1996:194). It will be noted that this paper draws heavily on Belich’s work 
mainly for the analysis of the early periods. I do so because his work in authoritative, 
comprehensive, balanced and assiduously referenced. 
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documented elsewhere (Pool 1991:esp. Chapt. 5), was to open the country to what 
Belich (1996) calls “swamping”. He sees this as something more than merely a 
passive wave, but one that was a major development strategy for the creation of an 
Anglo-Saxon New Zealand, what Belich (2001:passim) has called a “Better Britain”. 
Indeed “Julius Vogel, architect of a great public works drive in the 1870s [see next 
section of this paper], claimed repeatedly that his policy was aimed at speeding up the 
swamping of the Maori hinterland - an implicit acknowledgement of the limits of 
military victory” (Belich 1996:242). This swamping was dependent, then, on the rapid 
purchase of large amounts of Maori controlled land. Armed conflict between the 
British, regular troops, settler militias and “friendly Maori” on one side, and some iwi 
on the other, in the 1840s and again in the 1860s, had allowed the confiscation of land 
from those tribes which had fought the Crown, plus on occasions from some 
“friendlies”,4 but this was far from sufficient if swamping was to be achieved. This 
was realised in the next period to be discussed in this paper through the massive 
purchase of Maori land in the North Island using as an instrument the Native Land 
Courts introduced in 1862 specifically for the purpose of speeding up land alienation. 
This instrument was the vehicle for a particular and very successful mechanism: 
individualisation of communally-owned Maori land, a change that allowed Crown 
agents to inveigle or force individuals to sell. The tactic implemented from 1865 to 
1873 was to grant “tenure” to small numbers of “owners”, and then all others with 
rights to this same land had to go to court (even babies) to register this (Belich 
1996:258). 
 
While some North Island land was alienated in the period 1840-70, “The two-thirds of 
Maori land nominally alienated by 1861 was in the South Island [where Maori 
numbers were small]. Less than a quarter of the North Island had been sold by 1861" 
(Belich 1996:228). Swamping per se in the South Island came from the hordes joining 
gold rushes, whereas land alienation was more linked to the development of extensive 
pastoralism, sheep farming for wool. To a lesser degree the same pattern emerged in 
the Wairarapa and neighbouring Hawkes Bay, where Maori were relatively few and 
dispersed. The low density of Maori in the Sough Island and adjacent areas of the 
North did not mean that the processes of alienation were more benign, although in 
some areas co-terminous pastoralism and hunting by Maori continued for numbers of 
years (Belich 1996:passim). Equally, however, pastoralists, whether “proprietors” or 
“lessees” were adept, like their counterparts in “white” ranching populations overseas, 
in pushing on to native land even if their claims were invalid. 
 
The Pakeha New Zealand of this period was essentially a pre-industrial society, 
something like the Falklands today, the last pre-industrial white society. The 
industries were extractive, even wool farming, with little value added. Wool and gold 
dominated, plus kauri gum digging, and timber and flax milling (Belich 1996:Chapt. 
14). Ironically, it was some Maori who first industrialised to any degree, particularly 
                                                 
4  Eg. The more desirable Bay of Plenty coastal land confiscated from some Arawa who had fought 
with Gilbert Mair against neighbouring iwi. 
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through the milling and exporting of flour. They played a dominant role in commerce 
in the north, particularly from the Waikato to Auckland (Belich 1996:214-17). This 
ended with the Land Wars of the 1860s. 
 
This had major effects on the demography of New Zealand and its regions. The Maori 
population, mainly North Island in location went from something below 80,000 at 
Waitangi, to 57,000-58,000 in Fenton’s enumeration of 1857/1858, and 47,000 by the 
1874 census (Pool 1991:Chapts. 4 & 5). In contrast the Pakeha population 
mushroomed from perhaps a 1,000 or so in each island in 1840, to 34000 (NI, North 
Island) and 25,000 (SI) in 1858, to 112,000 (NI) and 188,000 (SI) in 1874. 
International migration would have played a very significant role in the redistribution 
of the Pakeha population. 
 
Table 1 shows that these global changes were accompanied by massive 
redistributions, geographically and ethnically. Essentially, the transfer of political 
capital had two impacts. 
 
Firstly, it laid the way for the brief dominance demographically of the South Island, 
although it must be recalled that much of this dominance came not from permanent 
settlement but from transitory populations associated with extractive industries.  
Moreover, once Maori are included in the count the South Island never reached a 
majority figure. Nevertheless, it also saw the development in the major southern urban 
centres of a functional base built around some processing, manufacturing and service 
industries whose economic significance was to persist long after the South Island lost 
its demographic dominance. 
 
Table 1: Factors of population distribution, New Zealand, 1840-1881 
 
 Year 
 1840 1857/58 1874 1881 
% of Pakeha in the South Island ?? 43 63 61 
% of Total in the South Island 
 
<5 23 43 43 
% of Total Maori 98 50 14   9 
 
Sources: Papps 1985: Pool 1991 
 
 
Secondly, it set in train the strategies that were to be pursued over the rest of the 19th 
century to shift the population distribution back towards the North.  To do this, it was 
first necessary to effect a major shift in the balance of control of what was then the 
most important form of physical capital: land.  As noted above, this resource had 
already been transferred in the South Island and in areas of the North with lower 
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concentrations of Maori,5 while confiscation in the 1860s had seen this transfer 
extended to the more desirable parts of the North Island Maori hinterland, the Waikato 
north of Kihikihi, lowland Taranaki, and the Bay of Plenty littoral. 
 
THE TRANSFER OF PHYSICAL CAPITAL, 1870-1926 
 
It is again Belich who provides the most dramatic description of the wresting of much 
of the remaining physical capital from Maori: “Between 1870 and 1916, Pakeha 
launched a climactic assault on Maori independence, identity and importance” 
(1996:248). It was only through this process, and most specifically through land 
alienation in the North Island Maori hinterlands, that three major demographic shifts 
could occur. 
 
1 Pakeha could assume overwhelming demographic dominance. 
2 Related to this last point, the Pakeha population could grow very rapidly 
3 The Pakeha populations’ geographical balance could shift again to the North 
Island. 
 
Land alienation was achieved, as described above, through the Native Land Courts.  
This conjures up the picture of some benign process of commercial law, as has been 
implied by some recent commentators.6 Nothing could be further from the truth as 
Belich (1996:passim) and Williams (1999) have demonstrated, in studies that support 
Sorrenson’s seminal work (1956). The Court was known as “the land-taking court” (te 
kooti tango whenua), a remarkably apposite term first used not by Maori but in 1867 
by Capt. Biggs, a Crown Agent (Williams 1999). Beyond this function the court 
processes, along with alienation under Public Works Acts and other pretexts, had 
severely negative effects, both in the short-term and over the longer-term, as I have 
documented empirically elsewhere (Pool 1991:Chapt.5). Moreover, unlike 
                                                 
5  In Northland, with its large Maori population prior to the 1880s, this balance had been, and 
continued to be, rather more complex.  Maori concentrations had long been in the northern two-
thirds, especially the northwest, while Pakeha settlements were scattered around ports (eg. The 
Bay of Islands), and small coastal and riverine flats such as Ruakaka and the Northern Wairoa. 
Timber milling and Kauri gum digging followed the distribution of these resources wherever 
topography permitted. When intensive pastoralism developed it was typically in the more southern, 
more fertile or flatter areas in which there were already Pakeha concentrations.  
6   See Chapple (2000) who argues that land sales gave Maori very significant capital assets that they 
could invest and use for economic development. I have a detailed critique of his paper (Pool: under 
editorial review), but suffice to say it flies in the face of all serious historical analysis, including of 
course Belich’s encyclopaedic, exhaustively documented and authoritative book (1996:passim), 
that is nowhere quoted in the Chapple paper – we may agree or disagree with Belich, but no 
subsequent historian can ignore him.  Indeed, the Chapple paper is also notable for its lack of 
documentation of evidence supporting the numerous surmises around which is built its central 
argument, essentially that the British rescued Maori, especially women, from underdevelopment. 
In his words, “mass British Colonisation of New Zealand was associated with remarkable 
improvements in the relative life chances of Maori women” (Chapple 2000:45). 
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confiscation that was brutal but immediate, the land purchase processes dragged on 
for decades, still occurring in various forms after World War II. Finally whereas 
confiscation had been limited in geographical extend, land purchase spread across 
every region of New Zealand. 
 
Launching and enabling this was massive resort to financial capital through 
borrowing, especially during Vogel’s premiership in the 1870s. “New Zealand’s 
ability to attract this tide of cash is as remarkable as its success in getting peopled, and 
has interlocked explanations. Migrants brought money, and money brought migrants” 
(Belich 1996:358). 
 
The role of finance was not so much to fund the transfer to physical capital, through 
land purchases per se, but in the rapid development of infrastructure, notably of 
railways, peaking in the 1870s, and through local government outlays, peaking in the 
1880s. Of significance among the estimates of private capital formation are those 
dealing with the residential, and agricultural and pastoral sectors. The former of these 
was related in the 1870s and 1880s to the huge migration inflows of that period, 
numerically among the largest ever, particularly of families, of the early part of that 
period. The latter was clearly linked to the attendant land settlement programmes 
(Hawke 1985:Fig. 4.3, 69-73; for migration inflows see Farmer 1985:Fig. 14:7 Pool 
and Bedford 1997). 
 
The importance of all this, and particularly the government sponsorship of the flows, 
for New Zealand’s subsequent demography including its regional dynamics, cannot be 
over-emphasised. The inflows were numerically equal to anything since, and were 
greater even than the enormous gold rush wave of 1863; proportional to base 
population sizes they were, of course, many times greater. Farmer, in a major analysis 
of migration policy, has identified its significance for us: “The 1870s stand out in New 
Zealand migration history for the magnitude of assisted migration under the [very 
aptly names] Immigration and Public Works Act of 1870.  Never has the influx of 
assisted immigrants to New Zealand been so great; the centrally operated plan to 
populate the whole country brought 115,000 people to New Zealand” (1985:70).8 
 
The net migration numbers of the 1860s and 1870s were not reached again in that 
period. Nevertheless, in the early 1900s and just after World War I there were 
significant inflows. 
 
I have argued in a number of fora that this era left yet another legacy. Ever since, New 
Zealand has seen migration as a simple way of priming the economic pump, as it 
                                                 
7  The migration trends for the 1870s and 1880s in Farmer’s figure are mirrored to a degree for 
residential capital formation in Hawke’s graph (Fig. 4.3). 
8  Richard Bedford (personal communication) notes that net inflows over the most recent 12 month 
period (to March 2002) may well, for the first time ever, exceed the Vogel era figure. 
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were, and we have viewed migrants not for the way that they enrich New Zealand in 
socio-cultural terms, but simply as a reserve army of workers, or as carriers of 
financial capital. This I would argue has produced a policy imbalance favouring 
recruitment and selection over settlement and integration. 
 
As I noted above, this inflow of people had other demographic ramifications. This is 
shown in Table 2. Firstly, the South Island lost its dominance even for Pakeha. 
Secondly, this was also a period when Maori reached their lowest ebb as a proportion 
of the total, although, as Sir James Carroll had signalled in the 1890s, they were 
starting on a period of growth that was to accelerate in the 20th century. What cannot 
be shown here is another aspect of population geography produced by the land grab, 
perhaps reinforced by the land reform (the slicing up of large estates) of the Liberal 
Government of the 1890s-early 1900s which had the effect of permitting “closer 
settlement” (Easton 1997:45). 
 
Table 2: Factors of population distribution, New Zealand, 1881-1926 
 
 Year 
 1881 1901 1926 
% of Pakeha in the South Island 61 49 41 
% of Total in the South Island 
 
43 47 39 
% of Total Maori   9   6   5 
 
Sources: Papps 1985: Pool 1991 
 
 
 
RELATIVE EQUILIBRIUM, 1916-1970 
 
It may seem strange that the decades that saw depression, war, the baby-boom, 
massive post-war immigration and even the Korean War wool bonanza could be rated 
here as ones in which some form of regional demographic equilibrium was 
established.  Yet, as I will show that did hold true in this period. 
              
I could have started this era around the 1880s from which years dates the phenomenon 
that Belich has called “recolonisation”. This involved “a renewal and reshaping of 
links between colony and metropolis... In New Zealand’s case, it reshuffled and 
tightened links with Britain between the 1880s and 1900s... The system had reached 
full fruition by the 1920s.” (2001:29). By the early 1900s “the Liberals... [had also] 
introduced the new institutions which bedded in and met the needs of the increasingly 
dominant pastoral economy... Selling meat and dairy products transformed the 
political economy... It was a political economy which was to dominate New Zealand, 
subject to minor modification, until the 1960s” (Easton, 1997:45). 
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But instead I have chosen to separate the formative years of recolonisation and of the 
establishment of this “political economy” (section on 1880 above) from its “fruition” 
between World War I and the 1960s, because, as I have just shown, the forging of 
colony- metropole linkages had a domestic analogue played out in terms of ethnic and 
regional redistribution, and the linkages these entailed. These were being worked out 
up until World War I. 
 
As a result, by World War I there was redistribution within New Zealand allowing it 
to become “a town supply district of London. London became the cultural capital of 
New Zealand” (Belich 2001:30). Using conventional New Zealand statistical 
definitions, the country was highly urbanised throughout the 20th century, despite its 
reliance on primary production and the export of commodities.  Nevertheless, as I will 
show, the population was less concentrated than would subsequently be the case – in 
this sense, then, New Zealand was less imbalanced than it became at the turn of the 
21st century. 
 
I finish this section of my paper at a turning point, around 1970, about which there is 
remarkable consensus. In terms of economic aggregates and patterns of employment 
Hawke (1985) provides compelling evidence for being rather precise. Indeed he 
devotes an entire chapter of his book to “Before and After 1967-68". The importance 
of these years is underlined in another way, as they were followed by a brief but sharp 
net migration outflow, the first since the depressions of the 1880s and 1930s,9 but one 
that was to be exceeded in the late 1970s/early 1980s (Farmer 1985:Fig.14). Easton 
sees this change as part of a longer-term erosion of New Zealand’s relative standing 
economically. “The decline [of the economy] in the decades after 1966 was sharper 
than before or after.” But a decrease relative to the OECD occurred over several 
decades, speeding up in the 1960s and 1970s (Easton 1997:15 and 25). 
 
Work at the Population Studies Centre sees the 1970s as a critical period, not just 
because it produced radical shifts in the timing and spacing of births, and, for both 
Maori and Pakeha, in family sizes, but also in patterns of contraception and union 
formation (cohabitation as against marriage). Co-varying in time were major shifts in 
income and labour force participation, and, in terms of religious beliefs, also a marked 
acceleration of secularisation (Pool et al 2000; Martin 1999). The early 1970s also 
saw net migration inflows that rivalled, but did not exceed, those 100 years earlier, 
and those that were to come in the 1990s (Farmer 1985:Fig 14.). The significance of 
this migration wave lies also in the fact that it represents a transformation. Until then 
migrants had come from Europe, mainly the British Isles and from Australia, and to a 
lesser degree North America, although at various times small but significant inflows 
occurred from other European countries and even from Asian sources.  But in the 
1970s these “whites” were joined by large numbers of Pacific Islanders, typically 
recruited as workers in manufacturing. The mix of origins – “European” (including 
                                                 
9  A very slight net outflow occurred in the mid-1920s, and the war years saw almost no movement 
(Farmer 1985: Fig.14). 
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Australia and South Africa) Pacific Island and Asian – was to become more common 
from then on. 
 
Belich identifies 1984 as a pivotal year of change. Nevertheless, he also makes the 
analytically critical point that such a shift does not occur in isolation, but in this case 
followed “the period 1972-84, when the context for restructuring was created.” 
(2001:394). 
 
Through all the trials and tribulations of the decades 1920-70, New Zealand seems, in 
aggregate, to have remained a society in which there was a sort of a balance to its 
population geography appropriate for its political economy. “As late as 1965, some 
ninety per cent of all exports were pastoral products, and half of all exports went to 
Britain” (Easton 1997:47). Demographic equilibrium underpinned these economic 
functions. Rural production was carried out by a farming population, who were 
serviced by small towns in which the major processing plants were located, and in 
which the main service industries – health and education, and local government – 
were found. The big cities performed the entrepot functions essential for importing 
and exporting, plus manufacturing and central government or corporate commercial 
functions. From 1938 to 1968 this tidy arrangement was reinforced by what was a 
“controlled economy” (Hawke 1985:Chapt. 9). 
 
The net effect seems to have been twofold: there was a balance in terms of different 
forms of capital, including social. This thus minimised the necessity for the sorts of 
transfers I have pointed to when discussing earlier years. And there was a population 
balance. 
 
The population equilibrium geographically is highlighted in Table 3. Here I take a 
different tack from my earlier ones to look at the balance between the “Big 3" 
metropoli (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, taking this as a measure of urban 
concentration), and the rest of New Zealand. 
 
Table 3: Factors of population distribution, New Zealand, 1926-1966 
 
 Year 
 1926 1966 
% of Total Population in “Big 3", Auck., Wgton, Ch’ch urban 
areas 
31 34 
% of Total Working age-group (20-59) in “Big 3" 34 38 
% of Foreign-born in “Big 3" 
 
39 41 
% of “Big 3's” Total population at Working ages 56 51 
% of Rest of New Zealand’s Total population at Working ages 51 46 
 
Sources: Censuses, 1926 and 1966 
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The upper panel shows a remarkable consistency both over time and for the different 
population categories. There was a relatively even distribution of both the population 
as a whole, and its factors of human capital that would be linked directly to 
development: the working age-group and the migrant population. A working age 
British immigrant was just as likely, then, to take up a job in Invercargill or Gisborne, 
as in Auckland. The same was also true for the per cent of the total in each regional 
grouping (“Big 3" and Rest of New Zealand) at working ages. Although there is a 
minor difference in per cents, this shifts almost in tandem in the two regions, in this 
case in relation to the factor of reproduction of human capital. The baby-boom effects 
become obvious in the age structures of both regional groupings, so that we can say 
that the boom was played out as much almost in metropolitan suburbia as in the 
country and smaller urban areas. 
 
The very broad regional breakdown used here also reflects what was happening at a 
lower level of aggregation: interprovincial migration and redistribution. Thus, as 
Brosnan (1986) has shown, prior to World War I population redistribution trends from 
1886 had been very significant, peaking in the quinquennium 1891-96 at 28 per cent 
of the 1896 population and continuing in this way until just before and after World 
War I. From then until 1966, in contrast, levels of redistribution were far lower.10 We 
then applied Brosnan’s methodology to regions closely approximating the old 
provinces, and found high levels of redistribution occurred later after 1970 in the 
period 1986-96 (to be discussed below). In fact, the level for 1991-96 (34%) is even 
higher than that exactly 100 years earlier. 
 
At an even lower level of aggregation than provinces, however, the situation may well 
have been more dynamic.  Certainly, for example, very rapid growth, far in excess of 
what could be expected through natural increase occurred for the non-Maori 
population of the Volcanic Plateau, a pioneer region both in the inter-war and post-
World War II years, with major construction projects and general development 
attracting both single workers and families (MoW 1960:106-108). 
 
But even the New Zealand of that era was not as homogeneous as this pastoral elegy 
might suggest.  The problem was that the more diverse elements were largely hidden 
in the earlier parts of this period. “Better Britain” may have been the standardised 
mode across much of the country, but at least until after World War II in its northern 
and eastern peripheries and in the less hospitable parts of the central North Island 
there was another New Zealand.  Recuperating from the loss of much of their North 
Island physical capital between 1875 and 1916, Maori were mainly located in more 
isolated areas. There they pursued a largely semi-subsistence economy, faced 
widespread poverty and attendant problems such as poor health and malnutrition, and 
had demographic regimes, high fertility and lower levels of life expectation, that were 
                                                 
10 Because of the timing of censuses and/or availability of detailed data (1906) Brosnan has to shift 
from quinquennia to decennia. Thus care has to be taken in interpreting his data – they are 
intercensal not annual rates. 
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different from those of the Pakeha majority. Let us be very clear about this: it was in 
our very recent past, and as I have documented elsewhere (Pool 1991:passim) was 
directly linked to the loss of land-based resources just a few years earlier. Thus the 
“elderly Maori of 1990 had been born in rural, semi-subsistence, isolated Maori 
communities and are the fortunate among a generation which, in childhood, had been 
subject to extremely high levels of mortality [by comparison with Pakeha children]” 
(Pool 1991:Chapt. 6 and 236). Viewed from a macro-perspective there were two 
separate populations, although Maori at that time still constituted less than six per cent 
of the Total. From a micro-perspective, however, the picture was far more complex as 
there were very high levels of intermarriage (overt and legal as well as consensual) 
and a degree of interaction through sport and other community activities (Bedford and 
Pool under editorial review). 
 
All this was to change dramatically, however, through the rural exodus of the latter 
part of this period (1945-70). The Maori urbanward movement of this time was 
perhaps the most rapid on record for a national population (Pool 1991:154, quoting a 
Univ of Calif., Berkeley study). It was Maori themselves who took what was often a 
drastic step yet necessary if they were to achieve economic development. That said, 
the policy environment of the day was not merely benign, but proactive. In what could 
now be seen as an early form of “Closing the Gaps”, government agencies facilitated 
this movement and attempted actively, albeit sometimes in what by today’s standards 
seems a paternalistic way, to assist Maori development (Pool 1991). There is no doubt 
at all that the efforts of Maori themselves were critical, and this assistance paid off 
because Maori living standards improved most significantly, especially among urban 
dwellers. Nevertheless, there were downsides, notably the way in which whanau and 
hapu were often torn apart by the migration process (Bedford and Pool, under editorial 
review). A longer-term downside was to emerge in the next period: the downsizing 
and devaluing of Maori human capital resources. 
 
TRANSFER OF HUMAN CAPITAL, 1970-1996 
 
The most recent period has seen once again a radical transfer of capital, in this case of 
human capital. The roots of this go back to before 1984, and in part rest more with a 
general global trend, for “it is a mistake to ignore the extent to which New Zealand is 
linked into the dynamics of other places elsewhere in the world” (Le Heron and 
Pawson 1996:6). 
 
Transfers of human capital in this period have been accompanied by flows of physical 
and financial capital, and these have often been massive. Many of the physical capital 
assets (eg. plants) have been abandoned rather than moved, less frequently replaced, 
and if movable perhaps cashed in by asset stripping corporations. Liberalisation both 
of financial markets and of regulations governing capital flows has not resulted in a 
boom in investment in productive sectors, infrastructure or plant. Moreover, where 
there has been investment this has frequently been in commercial office and 
residential property rather than in productive enterprises. What formerly were 
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domestically controlled financial institutions have frequently been co-opted and 
moved off-shore into foreign ownership. The negative effects of all this have been 
exacerbated by badly managed monetary policies, above all, so Easton argues, by the 
floating of the exchange rate (Easton 1997:50). 
 
Over and above this, so it has been argued, there was a mega-transfer towards the 
finance sector that has driven and superseded changes in the structures and dynamics 
of human and physical capital. In Jesson’s words: “a generation ago the economy was 
controlled by producers; these days the economy is run by financiers. A new elite has 
evolved globally, and [New Zealand] is now run for the benefit of rentiers, not 
producers” (1999:39). 
 
I will concentrate here, however, on the human capital transfers as these are more 
immediately demographic in nature. Moreover, any further changes in population 
distribution and development, that is any economic growth, must be driven above all 
by human capital, and certainly this must be the case if New Zealand is seriously to 
position itself as a “knowledge-society”. 
 
Table 4 has the same format as Table 3, but a major difference is immediately 
obvious. Over the last few decades of the 20th century there was an increasing 
concentration of population in the “Big 3" metropolitan zones. This was not just true 
at a global level, but for the working age population and for the foreign born. 
Essentially this means that over a very brief period there was a large-scale transfer of 
human capital (the working age population) into the most important urban areas, and 
this was reinforced by the tendency for the foreign born to cluster in metropoli. One 
must note that this is not at all an unusual pattern – it would almost certainly hold 
equally true for Canada and Australia – but it is contrary to the ethos of globalisation 
that sees decentralisation as a concomitant. 
 
The gap between the “Big 3" and the Rest in terms of the per cent of their own 
population at working ages remained intact (five percentage points) returning to the 
level it had been at in 1926.  But the shift upwards was part of a general age-structural 
change.  
 
Table 4: Factors of population distribution, New Zealand, 1966-1996 
 
 Year 
 1966 1996 
% of Total in “Big 3", Auck., Wgton, Ch’ch urban areas 34 46 
% of Total Working age-group (20-59) in “Big 3" 38 48 
% of Foreign-born in “Big 3" 
 
41 62 
% of “Big 3's” Total population at Working ages 51 57 
% of Rest of New Zealand’s Total population at Working ages 46 52 
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For Maori and Pacific Islanders human capital effects were even more marked, and in 
both cases were more extreme in some regions than in others.11 For example, the 
forestry industries of the central North Island, into which Maori had been drawn in the 
1950s and 1960s were radically restructured, and this had a drastic impact on the 
Maori workforce of that region. In many regions the manufacturing industries into 
which both Maori and Pacific Islanders had moved, as the major employee groups in 
some plants, were decimated. Thus what had seemed so positive in the period prior to 
the restructuring suddenly became negative. For both ethnic groups this involves 
radical intergenerational changes. For Maori, in contrast with the rural-born cohorts at 
older ages today (and the same applies to Pacific Islanders, except that the elders of 
today will have been island-born), the “kaumatua of [later this century]... will... have 
been urban born and raised, and throughout their lives will have been dependent on 
jobs in manufacturing or in service industries, or have suffered the long-term 
unemployment of the 1980s” (Pool 1991:236). 
 
DIVERSITY AND CONCENTRATION: 1986-96 
 
Although as I have noted earlier changes were underway from the late 1960s, the most 
important shifts were between 1984 and the end of the 1990s. This was induced of 
course by the restructuring introduced under “Rogernomics”, mainly covering 
economic aggregates, and initiated by the Labour Government, but propelled forward, 
particularly in areas of human capital and social sectors by National in the 1990s, 
most radically by the 1991 Budget. There was clearly a need for restructuring, but my 
critique is that the process was unplanned, driven by extreme ideology clothed in the 
guise of neo-classical economics, and was totally oblivious to social sector and above 
all human capital consequences (Pool 1999). New Zealand was not alone in 
undergoing structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) – most of Africa and the 
former Soviet Bloc states have also seen these, and Argentina is merely the most 
recent example.  But most, if not all, of the other examples of this carried out SAPs 
prescribed for them externally by the International Money Fund and/or the World 
Bank, and this included Argentina, “the International Monetary Fund’s model 
student...”, that today, following these SAPs, is in a dire situation (Klein 2002). New 
Zealand seems unique in the way in which it inflicted SAPs on itself – other 
developed countries went some of the way but it is New Zealand’s extremism and 
puritanism that sets it apart. 
 
Of course, as Le Heron and Pawson (1996) show there was also the inexorable march 
of globalisation. New Zealand was bound to change, but whether its self induced 
SAPs gave it the capacity to exploit globalisation, and more recently the knowledge-
wave, or made its task much harder is disputed among commentators. My own view is 
that the latter was the case (Pool 1999), and thus my perspective is similar to Easton’s 
(1997) and Jesson’s (1999). Certainly, as they document, the country also became 
                                                 
11 A detailed analysis of this is contained in a monograph being edited at present as a part of the 
FoRST-funded New Demographic Directions programme (Pool et al. forthcoming). 
  
14
more inequitable, and this had marked inter-regional (Portal 1999; Sceats 1999), as 
well as inter-personal manifestations. 
 
The net result was a major transfer of the more dynamic components of human capital 
away from much of New Zealand and a concentration in the “Big 3" urban centres, 
data on which are presented in Table 5. Accompanying this, as I noted earlier, were 
high levels of redistribution across the “provinces”. A major component of this would 
have been redistribution changes coming from international migration, quite possibly 
more than had been the case in any period since the Vogel era. 
 
I do not, however, deal with some of the negative consequences (eg. for the 
environment) of such a degree of concentration. Moreover, of course, much of the 
human and other capital resources also went offshore, but I do not document this here. 
The offshore transfers of human, financial and other capital resources constitutes 
almost a shift of political capital, a point I return to in the next section of my paper. 
 
The larger urban areas became increasingly dominant in terms of total numbers and 
those at working ages. This latter factor is important for momentum growth, for these 
are also the family building ages. As a result, the human capital factors of both 
production and reproduction are now concentrating in the metropolitan areas, a factor 
that increases the potential for further urban concentration. 
 
Fewer young workers in the “Big 3" were likely to be unemployed, and depend on 
benefits less, at least in 1996. There was clearly also increasing accumulation of the 
more skilled parts of the labour force in the “Big 3". 
 
Table 5: Some factors of human capital redistribution, 1986-1996 
 
 Year 
 1986 1996 
% of Total Population in “Big 3", Auck., Wgton, Ch’ch urban 
areas 
44 46 
% of Working age-group in “Big 3" 
 
45 48 
% of Labour Force Professional/Managerial, “Big 3" 22 37 
% of Labour Force Professional/Managerial, Rest of NZ 
 
15 27 
% of Population 15-64 on income support, “Big 3" ** 23 
% of Population 15-64 on income support, Rest of NZ ** 29 
 
Source: Censuses 1986 and 1996 
**  Because of changes in benefit eligibility comparable rates can not be computed for 1986 
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At the same time, largely because of international migration flows, New Zealand was 
becoming a more diverse society, but this diversity, at least as indicated by recent 
migrant ethnic origin was manifesting itself more in the metropolitan areas than in the 
Rest of New Zealand. This is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Ethnic distribution, 1986 and 1996 
             
 Year 
 1986 1996 
Ethnic Group Big 3 Rest NZ Big 3 Rest NZ 
Pakeha  80  83  67  75 
Maori  10  15  10  18 
Pacific Island  7  1  9  1 
Asian  2  1  8  2 
Other/Not spec  1  (<1)  6  4 
 
TOTAL 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 
 
INTO THE FUTURE: TRANSFERS OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CAPITAL? 
 
To conclude, the transfer of human and other capital resources over the last two 
decades has seen a high level of concentration, yet associated with this, increasing 
cultural diversity. Beyond this there have been other transfers offshore, particularly to 
Australia, and most notably in terms of corporate institutions (eg. company 
headquarters). Moreover, more and more New Zealanders (about 10 per cent each of 
the Total and of Maori, Bedford and Pool under editorial review) live in Australia, 
adding a demographic dimension to the commercial and other links. 
 
In these senses New Zealand may once again have become, at least in a de facto way, 
the “Seventh Child” (Belich 2001), the other Australian state. For a long period out 
economic interactions were a part of “recolonisation” – they bypassed Australia and 
went to Britain – but over the last few decades this has changed, and today the links 
are increasingly more with Australia, the Americas and Asia. This raises then several 
questions: 
 
$ In the present phase of globalisation, and particularly of economic integration with 
Australia, is New Zealand really just similar to say Western or South Australia, 
another peripheral state, but with its own historical trajectory that mediates some 
of the effects of integration? 
$ Is New Zealand now entering another phase of the transfer of political capital, or 
at least of economic sovereign control? It will be recalled that the first 30 years of 
colonisation essentially involved these processes. Did the experiences through 
which Maori passed then presage something that is now linked to the viability of 
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New Zealand as a whole? The loss of political, demographic and economic 
viability has long been predicted by Pacific Island specialists as a central problem 
to be faced by the small-island states to our north. But is New Zealand just another 
slightly larger Pacific small-island state? 
$ If that is the case, have the transfers of different forms of capital over the last 20 
years limited our capacity to remain viable? Or is our economy now more robust? 
$ If exploiting the knowledge wave is our means of regaining, or at least avoiding 
the loss of, viability, then to what extent have the human capital transfers of the 
last two decades enhanced or limited our ability to manage the knowledge-wave? 
$ Human capital driven developments need not be centralised. The creation of 
knowledge and its application to the production of saleable and/or exportable 
goods and/or intellectual property can be a “footloose” industry. Unlike the 
processing of protein products of the past, for example, it has no more need to be 
near a point of supply of components, than to be close to centres that develop 
research-based knowledge. To what extent have the transfers of human capital 
within New Zealand, as I illustrated earlier, albeit in a very crude way, limited the 
capacity of different regions to respond equitable to the challenge of knowledge-
driven development? 
 
All these are weighty questions. Yet they must be addressed as they underlie the 
analysis of migration and other population changes as these relate to development. To 
make the challenge more demanding the patterns and trends will be different at 
different geographic scales, as Britton, Le Heron and Pawson stressed in their 
analyses (1992, 1996). 
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